

IAC-D-57/67  
25 June 1957

Post-Mortem on NIE 62-57:  
Probable Developments in Thailand,  
dated 18 June 1957

I. Findings

We have encountered a number of major intelligence deficiencies in the preparation of this estimate which limit our ability to deal confidently with a number of important questions:

a. We lack adequate information on the composition, objectives and maneuverings of the various coup group factions, particularly the leadership, cohesion, and role of the junior coup group.

b. We lack information which would provide adequate basis for confident judgments of the influence, strength, and potential of the pro-Pridi and pro-royalist elements. We also lack adequate information on the relationships within these elements and between these elements and the major leaders and factions of the coup group.

c. Information is inadequate on the organization and activities of the Communists, both among the Thai and the Overseas Chinese.

d. We also lack adequate information on Thai foreign policy, and on trade plans and intentions with respect to Communist China.

e. Coverage of Thai popular attitudes toward the government, the US, Communism, Communist China, Pridi, and the 1957 elections is inadequate, particularly with respect to areas outside of Bangkok.

II. Action

It is requested that appropriate action be taken by the IAC agencies concerned with respect to these intelligence deficiencies.